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the metaphysical tradition and of a more sophisticated conception of God.
For the Milesian School, nature was something alive and divine. Although
in their alternative to the mythical approach to reality there are some signs
of atheist naturalism, they can also be seen as those who first proposed the
theistic metaphysical concept of God. The beginning of the rational tradi
tion, far from disposing entirely with the concept of God, was strongly
based on it. So, belief in God does not need to be taken as contradictory
to the pursuit of scientific discovery. In many cases and for many people,
including important scientists in the past and present, it can actually be a
meaningful pre-condition.
In short books with ambitious aims, missing points like the ones indicated
above are almost inevitable. This flaw is well counter-balanced by a provoca
tive, enjoyable style of presenting the ideas, and a good overview of the main
atheistic arguments. In a book of philosophy, an engaging tone is generally
an important quality. Like all short introductions, Baggini's book runs the
risk of treating its subject superficially. This is not a defect when it assumes its
role of being just a starting point for the discussion of a controversial theme.
The problem is that atheism is not subjected by him to any questioning in
its own right, as if it were immune to numerous criticisms that have been
made to it. In other words, it is doubtful whether this kind of introductory
text should be designed as a sort of intellectual defence artillery for atheists
(or for religious believers). A more neutral approach, dedicated to showing
the pros and cons of the debate involving atheism, would be more adequate.
Although it is not contrary to the alleged open-mindedness of the atheis
tic position defended by Baggini, the apologetic approach chosen sounds
a little strange, if not naive, and smacks a bit of advertising in many parts.
Considering theoretical debate the main function of a book of philosophy
(even a short one), and given the non-fundamentalist perspective adopted
by the author, this work should be recommended to the religious believer as
a means of fine-tuning his own beliefs in view of other perspectives, rather
than as a handbook to help the atheist maintain peace of mind.

R ethin kin g H um an N ature: A C hristian M aterialist A ltern ative to the Soul, by

Kevin J. Corcoran. Baker Academic, 2006. Pp. 152. $18.99 (paperback).
DAVID VANDER LAAN, Westmont College
R ethin kin g H um an N ature is an effort to bring the constitution view of per

sons to an audience of philosophy and theology students, as well as laypeople who are eager for an intellectual workout. The constitution view,
Corcoran argues, is a viable middle ground between dualism and what
he calls "nothing-but" materialism, combining in one view the theses that
human persons are not merely bodies and that humans are entirely ma
terial creatures. Throughout, Corcoran argues that the constitution view
is consistent with essential Christian beliefs and that where it parts com
pany with the bulk of the Christian tradition, the tradition's error can be
explained and the departure can be defended. As a book that brings a
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metaphysically sophisticated theory of human nature to a broad audience,
it occupies a useful niche.
The book is friendly in tone and generous in its consideration of alter
native views. Without oversimplifying, it concisely engages the dominant
positions on the mind/body problem and argues for the constitution view.
Corcoran is a model of humility. When he takes up the topic of substance
dualism, for example, Corcoran goes out of his way to insist that the ar
guments of dualists deserve a hearing, and that dualism is in no way in
tellectually substandard. This even-handed spirit of charitable critique
pervades the book.
Dualism is the topic of the first chapter, which discusses the substance
dualism of Plato and Descartes, the compound dualism of Aquinas, and
William Hasker's emergent dualism. This will be familiar territory for phi
losophers, and will serve as a fine overview for students. It is Aquinas's
view that receives the harshest assessment. Corcoran judges it to be inco
herent, despite Eleonore Stump's defense. Corcoran finds Hasker's emer
gent dualism to be a somewhat puzzling but nonetheless coherent view,
though not one which solves problems unsolved by the constitution view.
The assessment of substance dualism focuses on dubious premises of
various arguments for dualism, especially Descartes's. Corcoran does not
think that the usual arguments against substance dualism are compelling,
so his account of these is very brief.
The second chapter is a critique of a reductionistic "nothing-but" mate
rialism that identifies the human person either with a biological organism
(animalism) or the matter that composes it. Corcoran explains the difficulties
of accounting for persistence across time and explaining consciousness. The
chief objection, however, rests on the intuition that persons are essentially
persons, where a person is understood to be an entity capable of conscious
experience. Suppose a mad surgeon were to remove your cerebral cortex,
leaving a respirating, metabolizing, unthinking shell. Could such a remain
der possibly be you? Corcoran is convinced that it could not. The animalist,
though, is committed to this possibility, since it is apparently possible for a
human organism to persist through the loss of the cerebral cortex.
The constitution view is explained in the third chapter. On this view, a
piece of paper may con stitu te a dollar bill without being identical to it. The
paper and the bill are distinct objects because they have different histories
and potentialities. The paper could come to have a uniform shade of blue,
say, though the bill could not. Applied to human beings, the idea is that
a body constitutes a person without being a person. A body sometimes
survives changes a person cannot, and, as the following chapter makes
clear, the body exists before the essentially-capable-of-consciousness per
son comes to be. Thus the person is wholly material without being identi
cal to a human body.
Theologically, Corcoran observes, we may want to point out that hu
mans are essentially relational. This fits his account well, he says, since
the constitution view characterizes persons as having first-person per
spectives. A social and linguistic environment is causally necessary for
the formation of a first-person perspective, and so relatedness is needed
both for personhood and for being the particular kind of person one is. It
is not clear from Corcoran's discussion why the dualist or "nothing-but"
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materialist could not affirm the relatedness of human persons in just the
same way, though, so his comment that the constitution view is preferable
to other views overreaches.
Corcoran argues that most of the common philosophical objections to
the constitution view dissolve on careful consideration. He grants that it is
counterintuitive that distinct physical objects can occupy exactly the same
space at the same time, but opines that the positive considerations for the
view outweigh the worry. Here he also addresses objections based on the
doctrine of the incarnation and the notion of the im ago dei.
Corcoran devotes his longest chapter to stem cell research, cloning, and
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, topics he sees as potential stumbling
blocks for much of his intended audience. The chapter begins with an ar
gument that neither materialism nor dualism entails or precludes an ethic
of life. These metaphysical views must be supplemented with moral prin
ciples if they are to yield conclusions about the controversial issues that
surround the beginning of life.
The matter concerns Corcoran since on his view an early term fetus is
not and does not constitute a person. Even the human organism that will
come to constitute a person does not begin to exist until thirteen days after
fertilization, at an early estimate. Until that point the dividing cells of the
morula and later the blastocyst are a collection rather than an individual
object. One might fear that such a view implies that we have no ethical
obligation to preserve these early products of fertilization.
But the constitution view has no such implication, Corcoran argues.
The biblical themes of creation, incarnation, and resurrection are an en
thusiastic declaration of the value of the material world, and so they pro
vide Christians with good reason to preserve early products of fertiliza
tion even if they are not persons or human organisms. The doctrine of
the incarnation in particular gives us prim a fa c ie reason to hold prenatal
life in high regard. Corcoran draws on these biblical themes in a variety
of ways, concluding that human embryos should be created only if they
are intended for implantation. Hence embryos should not be created for
stem cell research that will eventually destroy them, and in vitro fertiliza
tion can be used to create multiple embryos only if the parents are willing
to implant all the embryos so created. On the other hand, non-embryonic
stem cell research is permissible or even obligatory; the doctrines of in
carnation and resurrection push us to seek the consummation of God's
kingdom of healing and wholeness. The discussion includes a thorough
and helpful introduction to the early stages of embryonic development,
which Corcoran treats with a metaphysician's eye for questions of persis
tence and unity.
The chapter's greatest weakness is the somewhat tenuous connection
between its motivating theology and its ethical conclusions. Creation, in
carnation, and resurrection are centrally important themes for Christian
thinking about materiality and embodiment. Corcoran's non-trivial en
gagement with them is laudable. But the notion that human reproduction
ought to mirror the giving character of divine creation, for example, itself
needs to be supplemented in order to yield the result that it is morally
impermissible to create more embryos than are intended for implantation.
Might not the creation of surplus embryos be a way of giving, a means
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for increasing the likelihood of a successful pregnancy? If a blastocyst
is not a person, why not use it to help ensure that a full-fledged person
will come to be? Even if the theological arguments are only suggestive,
though, Corcoran has succeeded in illustrating how a materialist with sol
idly Christian intuitions may be a principled defender of prenatal life.
The fifth chapter canvasses the recent philosophical discussion about
resurrection. Materialists have faced the puzzle of how a resurrected per
son can be identical to a person who once died, given that the corpse de
cays and disintegrates. Corcoran says it is plausible that dualists are no
better off than materialists, though, since they must account for how the
resurrection body can be the same body as that which died. Many early
and medieval Christians, though they were dualists, wrestled with this
very problem. Indeed, Corcoran suggests, having the same body again is
what makes it a resurrection as opposed to a reincarnation.
Historically, the most common solution was a reassembly view. Though
he offers some promising replies to the standard objections, Corcoran ul
timately rejects this view because it includes no immanent causal relation
between stages of a person's life. So he explores two other possibilities:
gappy existence (i.e., death followed by nonexistence and then resurrec
tion) and non-gappy survival (via fissioning as described below). Corcoran
argues that each is logically consistent with the requirement of an imma
nent causal relation, so that the materialist has several ways of understand
ing the possibility of resurrection.
The final chapter aims to show that the constitution view is consistent
with the teaching of the Bible. Corcoran places a refreshing emphasis on
the need for holistic interpretation of the Scriptures rather than an ap
proach centered on a few proof texts, though he does take time to consider
of number of specific passages that appear to imply or presuppose a dualistic anthropology.
Both the Old and the New Testaments, Corcoran argues, are consistent
with the idea of an em bodied existence between death and resurrection.
At the moment of death the matter of the body would fission, producing
both the corpse and, elsewhere, the matter that constitutes a living body,
the same body that existed before death. Later the body would be glori
fied in the general resurrection. This accommodates an intermediate (i.e.,
postmortem and pre-resurrection) state of consciousness, which Corcoran
believes to be taught by Scripture. The idea of intermediate embodiment is
typically overlooked, Corcoran observes. John Cooper, for example, con
siders only three resurrection possibilities: immediate resurrection, nonexistence/re-creation, and the dualistic disembodiment/re-embodiment.
Corcoran takes Jesus' resurrection to be paradigmatic of human resur
rection generally. For the intermediate embodiment view, this raises the
question how Jesus could have a living, intermediate body if his body was
also lying lifeless in the tomb. Corcoran sensibly replies that it was Jesus'
corpse which occupied the tomb while his intermediate body was active
elsewhere. However, Corcoran does not address the further question of
what happened to the corpse before the discovery of the empty tomb on
Easter morning. No doubt a story could be told. The corpse was stolen af
ter all, or else it miraculously evaporated. But the latter would be an ad hoc
appendage to a story that is already, in Corcoran's phrase, "a whopper."

350

Faith and Philosophy

It is also worth noting that on the intermediate embodiment view a "res
urrection" is the glorification of an already existing and living body. In
no sense is it a rising from the grave. This is ironic given Corcoran's sug
gestion that contemporary dualists have neglected or misunderstood the
meaning of 'resurrection.'
One of the principal ideas of the chapter is that the biblical case for du
alism is not as straightforward as it is sometimes assumed. That is a point
well worth making. Though a dualist interpretation can be defended, the
anthropological teaching of the text (if any) is not entirely explicit. But it
is also true that the materialist alternatives, and the intermediate embodi
ment view in particular, face some serious challenges.
Overall, R ethin kin g H um an N ature is an excellent entry to current Chris
tian reflection on the relation between mind and body, as well as the sur
rounding ethical and theological issues. It engages the reader, succinctly
covers a wide range of arguments, and exemplifies thoughtful and care
ful reflection from a thoroughly Christian perspective. Corcoran does not
pretend that all readers will be convinced by the case for the constitution
view, but he offers his audience an appealing invitation to take it serious
ly. For many students and non-specialists, R ethin kin g H um an N ature will
be the best available introduction to an important facet of contemporary
thinking on mind and body.

Providence, Evil and the O penness o f God, by William Hasker. Routledge,

2004. Pp. 224. $130 (hardback).
DOLORES G. MORRIS, University of Notre Dame
"How does God run the world?" How can we account for "the prevalence
of evil in a world supposedly governed by a God who is wise, good, and
powerful?" (p. 1) In Providence, Evil and the O penness o f God, William Hasker
offers a series of reflections based largely upon these questions. Each chap
ter of this volume is a stand-alone essay, though all are united by one cen
tral theme: the superiority of open theism over rival conceptions of divine
providence with respect to both the problem of evil and the existence of
libertarian free will.
This volume is divided into two parts. The five essays in Part One com
prise a discussion of the problem of evil; these essays deal very little with
the differences among competing accounts of divine providence, but focus
instead on the beliefs shared by most traditional theists. Hasker spends al
most no time on the logical problem of evil, referring the reader to Alvin
Plantinga's Free-Will Defense. Instead, the focus here is on the evidential
problem of evil, "the version which claims that God's existence is im prob
able given the evidence of evil." (p. 24)
Prior to the discussion of the evidential problem, however, is an essay
pertaining to the existential problem of evil. This version of the problem is
articulated in the form of m oral protest against a God who would create a
world in which suffering is prevalent. In chapter one, "On regretting the

